Such a reverse auction would collect offers from developers of decarbonization or renewable-energy projects to sell the future carbon credits those projects would create. Up to a specified amount of credits, Ottawa would acquire the credits offered at the cheapest price. This would provide developers with necessary price certainty for “bankability” of their projects.
The federal government can also serve as a “market maker,” selling to emitters who seek credits for compliance and providing liquidity as these markets mature. Analogous to a central bank’s open market operations, government interventions to stabilize carbon markets can attract financial institutions to provide further liquidity.some estimate
at US$800-billion. Lawmakers lack perfect information about each developers’ costs and therefore risk subsidizing projects that would have been built without or with lesser subsidy. While the IRA will accelerate U.S. progress toward its 2030 emissions targets, decarbonizing further will likely require even more generous subsidies – or ultimate adoption ofOn the surface, the IRA tax credits offer projects less value than would offsets under Alberta’s industrial carbon pricing regime.
In contrast, in Alberta, such projects can create offsets for a 20-year period, and the current federal government requires provinces to increase the carbon price to $170 a tonne by 2030. Alongside the generous investment tax credit for CCS in theHowever, one problem is the