For example, in 2019, when South Korean courts found Japan potentially liable for forced labour during the Second World War, Japan threatened the South Korean electronics industry. Companies such as Samsung, based in Suwon-si, South Korea, relied on chemicals and components, including fluorinated polyimide and photoresists, to make their products. This made them vulnerable to pressure from Japan, which produced 90% of these precursors.
Other nations could be brought into line. The United States also controls crucial intellectual property and design software for semiconductors. Fearing loss of access, non-US-based semiconductor manufacturers, including the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in Hsinchu, are complying with the US ban on exports to Russia.
Other vulnerabilities are more obscure. Only businesses themselves know what their supply chains actually look like, and even their knowledge is imperfect. They often know their first-tier suppliers , and might know their second-tier suppliers . After that, things get murky. Russian retaliation might give rise to a vicious spiral of counter retaliation. Debates on nuclear war and cybersecurity conflicts focus on whether a shared understanding of a ‘ladder of escalation’, from less to more extreme uses, can lower risksIt is possible that the strong network of countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their allies will deter countermeasures. Equally, targeted countries might consider other ways to retaliate.